Judging, Fast and Slow
Using Decision-Making Theory to Explore Judicial Fact Determination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12596122 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Emma Cunliffe (0000-0002-8888-3252, Associate Professor, UBC Faculty of Law, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 139-180 |
| Publication date | 2014-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The International Journal of Evidence & Proof (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1365-7127 • E-ISSN: 1740-5572 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1350/ijep.2014.18.2.447 |
| OpenAlex | W2032902571 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
Empirical research with judges and jurors has provided research into the process by which legal decision-makers come to a view about the facts of the case. However, much remains uncertain, including questions about how judges' reasoning processes might differ from jurors' when thinking through the facts of a case, and how well the insights of decision-making research translate into the noisy context of real criminal trials. This article offers a preliminary exploration of connections between Pennington and Hastie's story model of decision-making, heuristics and biases research, and areas of fact determination that have presented persistent difficulties to criminal courts, including sexual assault, child homicide and the assessment of expert testimony. I discuss some of the key insights that cognitive psychology can offer to those who are interested in understanding how decision-makers think about the facts of a case, and where decision-makers may be prone to error
Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Computer Science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Jury Decision Making Processes · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |