A republican argument for the rule of law

Bibliographic Data

ID12609754
AuthorsFrank Lovett (0000-0002-9745-5559, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis, St Louis, USA, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume26
Issue2
Pages137-158
Publication date2020-03-10
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1369-8230 • E-ISSN: 1743-8772
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13698230.2020.1737473
OpenAlexW3011232923
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited20

While the rule of law is surely a very important good, the familiar discussions found in the literature lead many to conclude that it is either a relatively trivial political ideal, or else a redundant one. What is needed is a new and persuasive defense of the rule of law that properly reflects its great significance for human well being. An important step towards building such an argument is to question a widely-shared but often unnoticed assumption that the rule of law should be understood as a virtue of legal systems. The path is then cleared for a republican argument built on two theses: first, the thought that an ideal society would be one in which no one is the master of anyone else, and second, the thought that our freedom from domination is not natural or pre-institutional

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Rule of law · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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