Children (and animals) in Nozick’s political philosophy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12609802 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joe Milburn (0000-0003-0638-8555, Loughborough University, corresponding author), Arabella Fisher (Hong Kong Metropolitan University) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Pages | 1-19 |
| Publication date | 2026-02-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1369-8230 • E-ISSN: 1743-8772 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13698230.2026.2630586 |
| OpenAlex | W7133906088 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 20 |
According to Susan Moller Okin, Robert Nozick’s libertarianism leads to a matriarchal dystopia: mothers own their children and may dispose of them as they please. This challenge rests on the claim that Nozick does not extend rights to infants. In this paper, to respond to Okin, we examine Nozick’s account of rights possession; explore Nozick’s work beyond Anarchy, State, and Utopia; and link children’s rights and animals’ rights. We propose three possible responses to Okin, grounded in Nozick’s own words. First, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their membership in the human species. Second, Nozick could grant rights to infants, but not animals, on account of their potentiality. Third, Nozick could grant rights to both infants and animals. We suggest that the third option is the most promising.
Argument (complex analysis · Normative · Political philosophy · Politics · Work (physics · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Highly cited | No |
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