Optimal emission taxation and the Porter hypothesis under Bertrand competition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12613393 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Flavio Delbono (0000-0001-9030-4048, Department of Economics University of Bologna, corresponding author), Luca Lambertini (0000-0001-6353-4753, Department of Economics University of Bologna) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 93 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 755-765 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-02 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/apce.12338 |
| OpenAlex | W3183084810 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 24 |
Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win‐win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable
Bertrand competition · Bertrand paradox (economics) · Competition (biology · Cournot competition · Duopoly · Economics · Incentive · Marginal cost · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Oligopoly · Strategic complements · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies · Ecology
| Highly cited | No |
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