Bargaining Credibility and the Limits to Within‐firm Pensions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12614643 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jan Erik Askildsen (0000-0002-2663-8008, University of Bergen, corresponding author), Norman J Ireland (University of Warwick) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 515-528 |
| Publication date | 2003-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2003.00233.x |
| OpenAlex | W2142402296 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
A simple bargaining model highlights the role of commitment to a low‐risk investment policy for firms which offer within‐house pension and health insurance schemes. The roles of this commitment level plus bargaining power, and the ability of a failing firm to misappropriate pensions funds, are studied and their influence on the equilibrium pension determined
Bargaining power · Bargaining problem · Business · Credibility · Economics · Investment (military · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Pension · Power (physics · Simple (philosophy · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Retirement, Disability, and Employment · Finance
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2005 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |