Regulation Strategies for the Provision of Paternalistic Goods
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12615178 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laura Levaggi (0000-0001-9692-3114, Faculty of Science and Technology Free University of Bolzano‐Bozen Italy), Rosella Levaggi (0000-0002-6018-1283, Department of Economics University of Brescia Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 471-498 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-27 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/apce.12161 |
| OpenAlex | W2580549781 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 42 |
In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial
Business · Competition (biology · Consumer choice · Economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Paternalism · Productivity · Profit (economics · Public economics · Quality (philosophy · Service (business · Service provider · Subsidy · Welfare · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Marketing
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |