Efficiency and Program‐Contract Bargaining in Spanish Public Hospitals

Bibliographic Data

ID12615477
AuthorsJuan Ventura (0000-0001-7689-9348, Universidad de Oviedo, corresponding author), Eduardo González (0000-0003-0732-6567, Universidad de Oviedo), Ana Cárcaba García (0000-0001-7487-0031, Universidad de Oviedo)
Year2004
Volume75
Issue4
Pages549-573
Publication date2004-11-10
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-8292.2004.00262.x
OpenAlexW2064245138
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited10

This paper analyses the evolution of productivity in Spanish public hospitals during the period characterised by the use of program‐contracts. The results demonstrate that a significant improvement has occurred. The decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index shows that efficiency change has been the main contributor to productivity improvement. We also analyse the dynamic implications of program‐contract bargaining. In particular, the data support the hypothesis that the bargaining process has been subject to a ratchet effect, i.e., the more a hospital does today, the more the hospital is asked to do in the future. This result threatens the credibility of the program‐contract as an incentive system

Bargaining power · Business · Contract management · Credibility · Economic growth · Economics · Incentive · Index (typography · Management · Microeconomics · Political science · Productivity · Ratchet · Ratchet effect · Total factor productivity · Computer Science · Efficiency Analysis Using DEA · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Law · Marketing

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