Horizontal Mergers With Capital Adjustment
Workers' Cooperatives and the Merger Paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12615502 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Flavio Delbono (0000-0001-9030-4048, University of Bologna Italy, corresponding author), Luca Lambertini (0000-0001-6353-4753, University of Bologna Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 529-539 |
| Publication date | 2016-02-22 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1370-4788 • E-ISSN: 1467-8292 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/apce.12125 |
| OpenAlex | W2541111700 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
We study the incentives towards horizontal merger among firms when the amount of capital is the strategic variable. We focus on workers' cooperatives, but our conclusions apply also to employment‐constrained profit maximizers. Within a simple oligopoly model, we prove that the horizontal merger, for any merger size, is: (i) privately efficient for insiders as well as for outsiders; (ii) socially efficient if market size is large enough, even in the case of merger to monopoly
Business · Capital (architecture · Cournot competition · Economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Oligopoly · Profit (economics · Variable (mathematics · Cooperative Studies and Economics · Corporate Finance and Governance · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Highly cited | No |
|---|