The influence of the competition amongst pressure groups to provide ecosystem services on the optimal rotation length of forest stands
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12632008 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Deegen (0000-0001-9095-5561, Technische Universität Dresden, corresponding author), Andreas Halbritter (Technische Universität Dresden) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 167 |
| Pages | 103300-103300 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Forest Policy and Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1389-9341 • E-ISSN: 1872-7050 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.forpol.2024.103300 |
| OpenAlex | W4400956726 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 25 |
A significant segment of the variety of forest ecosystem services is neither demanded nor supplied through market exchange, but is provided essentially through political processes. In this paper, we present an economic analysis of forest stand management under consideration of politically provided ecosystem services. In this, competition between pressure groups seeking to grasp privileges plays an important role. We extend the Hartman model with elements of the pressure group models. We incorporate the amount of the reward derived from the political contest, the effectiveness factor of the forest owner in the political competition and the lobbying investment made by the forest owner. We show that the competition amongst pressure groups has a profound impact on the optimal rotation length compared to the classical solution by Faustmann. We discuss, how the competition amongst pressure groups shapes the optimal rotation length when forest stand management provides multiple forest ecosystem services. We also address the levels of the reward derived from the political contest and the effectiveness factor in the context of the urban–rural interface. • We extend the Hartman model with elements of the pressure group models. • The competition amongst pressure groups has a profound impact on the optimal rotation length compared to the classical solution by Faustmann. • Strong pressure groups will maintain a longer rotation length for age-increasing rewards for the ecosystem services provided, while weak pressure groups will shorten the rotation length. • Higher rewards for ecosystem services also trigger higher investments in lobbying • Forest owners with a relatively strong competitive position have an incentive to support high valuations of ecosystem services; vice versa
Agroforestry · Biology · Business · Competition (biology · Economics · Ecosystem · Ecosystem services · Environmental resource management · Forest ecology · Natural resource economics · Rotation (mathematics · Bioenergy crop production and management · Environmental Science · Forest ecology and management · Forest Management and Policy · Mathematics · Ecology
Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society
The Harvesting Decision Whena Standing Forest Has Valuea
Constitutional Design and the Urban/Rural Divide
The urban-rural polarisation of political disenchantment
Political parties
Political parties as allies for the forestry sector
A combined economic analysis of optimal planting density, thinning and rotation for an even-aged forest stand
The neglected stepchildren of forest-based ecosystem services
Special problems of forests as ecologic–economic systems
Pareto on public choice
Rent-seeking contests with incomplete information
The timber wars
A Public Choice Analysis of Endangered Species Listings
Why Cities Lose
Public Finance in Democratic Process. Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice
The Economics of Forestry and Natural Resources
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
The Rural-Urban Interface
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |