Must the Radical Skeptic Be Intellectually Akratic
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12641441 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, corresponding author), Peter Lang (0000-0003-3318-6166) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 207-219 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Facta Philosophica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1424-0602 • E-ISSN: 2296-4231 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3726/93522_207 |
| OpenAlex | W2052771990 |
| Language | EN |
Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery
Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Positive economics · Skepticism · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Artificial Intelligence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |