Habermas' "Species Ethics", and the Limits of "Formal Anthropology

Bibliographic Data

ID12643102
AuthorsSomogy Vargas (0000-0001-9383-7843, University of Osnabrück and University of Copenhagen, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume12
Issue1
Pages71-89
Publication date2011-01-12
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Horizons (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1440-9917 • E-ISSN: 1568-5160
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1558/crit.v12i1.71
OpenAlexW2081310551
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited16

This article seeks to defend two claims: First, that universalist ethics in Habermas and Rawls cannot function without some recourse to the good Life, or human well-being. Second, that such ethical reflection must involve formal anthropological considerations. In other words, it must involve a consideration of the good that also encompasses reflection on what we are as humans. As an example, the paper draws on Habermas' recent thoughts on "species-ethics". I will argue that "species ethics" needs to be substantiated and expanded with the help of an "anthropology of recognition

Biology · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Function (biology · Philosophical anthropology · Reflection (computer programming · Sociology · Computer Science · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Religion, Ecology, and Ethics

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