Examining Honneth’s Positive Theory of Recognition

Bibliographic Data

ID12643154
AuthorsKristina Lepold (0000-0002-2745-8586, Department of Philosophy, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume20
Issue3
Pages246-261
Publication date2019-07-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Horizons (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1440-9917 • E-ISSN: 1568-5160
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14409917.2019.1644810
OpenAlexW2966161872
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited29

In this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice of recognition as a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with

Context (archaeology · Critical theory · Epistemology · Focus (optics · Sociology · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics

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