Active Respect and Critical Solidarity

Bibliographic Data

ID12643331
AuthorsRoberto Mordacci (0000-0002-6949-549X, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume25
Issue1
Pages2-12
Publication date2024-01-02
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCritical Horizons (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1440-9917 • E-ISSN: 1568-5160
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14409917.2024.2313433
OpenAlexW4391836454
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited24

This article argues that, to distinguish between "critical" and "uncritical" solidarity, the normative concept of solidarity must be grounded on the principle of respect for persons. I start analyzing the principle of respect for persons from a modified Kantian perspective, arguing that it must be interpreted as a normative relation of power in which each person must recognize the autonomy of the other as a source of power. In this perspective, the principle of respect offers a foundation for an ethical assessment of situations in which ethical solidarity is required. By drawing on the distinction between passive and active respect, I argue that solidarity is grounded on the duty of active respect in the face of danger or oppression and that this foundation allows us to distinguish between critical (i.e. appropriate) and uncritical (i.e. inappropriate) solidarity

Critical theory · Epistemology · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Solidarity · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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