Deadly ethnic conflict and the imperative of power sharing

Could a consociational federalism hold in Rwanda

Bibliographic Data

ID12676899
AuthorsRaphael Chijioke Njoku (University of Louisville, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume43
Issue1
Pages82-101
Publication date2005-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCommonwealth and Comparative Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1466-2043 • E-ISSN: 1743-9094
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14662040500054487
OpenAlexW2019747532
LanguageEN
Citations received1

Principles of consociationalism and federalism have been successfully adopted by the strategic elites in a number of countries, including some in Africa, turning their once volatile politics into a more amicable order. It is proposed that the best hope for a less conflictual politics in Rwanda resides in an elite disposition towards political accommodation and the adoption of the non-majoritarian political arrangements associated with consociational federalism. This agenda is discussed in light of both the structural dimensions of consociationalism and federalism and, more briefly, of relevant African examples of their utilisation. Application of appropriately configured consociational and federal arrangements is presented as an imperative in such a deeply divided polity, where power commands monopolistic access to available resources and where those in power often employ violence and exclusion to safeguard their interests

Democracy · Economic system · Economics · Elite · Ethnic conflict · Federalism · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Polity · Power (physics · Power sharing · Sociology · Law · Middle East and Rwanda Conflicts · Political Conflict and Governance

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