A mass psychosis”

The Netherlands and Nato's dual-track decision, 1978–1979

Bibliographic Data

ID12695475
AuthorsRuud van Dijk (University of Amsterdam, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume12
Issue3
Pages381-405
Publication date2011-11-22
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueCold War History (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1468-2745 • E-ISSN: 1743-7962
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/14682745.2011.621750
OpenAlexW2060995213
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

When NATO took its so-called dual-track decision on Theatre Nuclear Weapons in December 1979, the Dutch government, while joining the decision, declared that it would not decide on the deployment of the Dutch share of the new weapons for another two years. With the help of new documents from Dutch archival collections, this essay examines the reasons behind this decision by the centre-right Van Agt government. It shows that there was great reluctance in parliament, but also in the cabinet, to contemplate the coming modernisation. In order to survive politically and keep the Netherlands within the NATO fold, the Van Agt government tried to align NATO's decision as closely with Dutch policy as possible while seeking majority support in parliament for its proposed compromise solution. The essay provides new detail on both efforts, including the response of allied governments to the Dutch reservations

Business · Cabinet (room · Compromise · Dual (grammatical number · Government (linguistics · Order (exchange · Parliament · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Engineering · Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics · Law · Public Administration · Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

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