Bureaucratic respectful equality

Bibliographic Data

ID12717563
AuthorsChristopher Nathan (0000-0002-2386-3517, University of Warwick, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume18
Issue4
Pages529-540
Publication date2016-08-12
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Political Theory (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1474-8851 • E-ISSN: 1741-2730
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/1474885116660028
OpenAlexW2510949498
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited12

Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called ‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect involves abstaining from making or acting on judgements about others. Aside from arguing for its justificatory role, Carter also argues that, in this role, it has a series of implications for our thinking about liberal politics. I argue, first, that the theoretical implications of the view that opacity respect grounds equality are narrower than they first appear. This is because, in order to put the view into action, one must make a certain kind of empirical claim. Second, I show that this point reveals an important structural aspect of Carter’s view, concerning the way that principles can be limited in practice. Third, I argue that the practical implications of the view are potentially much broader than they first appear, threatening absurdity. This is because the position’s repercussions naturally extend into day-to-day transactions

Absurdity · Action (physics · Aside · Bureaucracy · Economic Justice · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Order (exchange · Original position · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Positive economics · Sociology · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification

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