Inciting Speech in the former Yugoslavia

This article critically examines the recent Trial Chamber judgment in the Šešelj case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, focusing on two aspects: first, the findings relating to incitement to hatred as the crime against humanity of persecution and, secondly, the Chamber’s holdings on the mode of liability of instigation in relation to other crimes. First, the majority judgment’s as well as the individual opinions’ holdings on whether the accused’s incitement to hatred constituted persecution is looked at in view of international case law. The article criticizes the majority and Judge Antonetti’s disregard for relevant case law by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Trial Chamber missed an opportunity to clarify the status of incitement to hatred as persecution. Secondly, the judges’ findings with respect to instigation are critically examined. It is acknowledged that given the nature and context of Šešelj’s speeches, the required causal link to any substantive crimes may be difficult to prove. The article criticizes the fact that international criminal law does not yet recognize a separate inchoate offence of public incitement to all crimes, and not merely genocide

Context (archaeology · Crimes against humanity · Criminology · Genocide · Hatred · Incitement · International law · Persecution · Political science · Sociology · Tribunal · War crime · European and International Law Studies · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights · History · Law