Hume and the Guise of the Bad
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12741797 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Francesco Orsi (0000-0002-4984-1033, University of Tartu, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 39-56 |
| Publication date | 2020-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Scottish Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1479-6651 • E-ISSN: 1755-2001 |
| Publisher | Edinburgh University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3366/jsp.2020.0254 |
| OpenAlex | W3011051368 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 15 |
In Treatise 2.3.4.5 Hume provides an explanation of why ‘we naturally desire what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful’. Hume's explanation of this phenomenon has barely received any attention so far. But a detailed analysis bears fruit for both Humean scholarship and contemporary moral psychology. After putting the passage in its context, I explain why desiring and taking pleasure in performing certain actions merely because they are unlawful poses a challenge to Hume's theory of evaluation. Then I propose a solution of the challenge which draws on Hume's treatment of malice, and highlights the role played by comparison and the self in these apparently paradoxical passions. Finally, I distinguish three views in contemporary discussions of desiring something under the guise of the bad (negationism, parasitism, at-face-valuism), and I argue that Hume's account stands out as a particularly plausible version of the third view
Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Malice · Passions · Phenomenon · Pleasure · Political science · Scholarship · Emotions and Moral Behavior · History · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |