Unmaking Détente

Although Yugoslavia was not a major power, it played a significant role in the Cold War. The West initially perceived Josip Broz Tito, who became the country's leader in the wake of its partition and occupation by the Axis, to be the most loyal follower of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. But Stalin soon came to perceive Tito as a rival and expelled Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1948, hoping to precipitate Tito's downfall. Yugoslavia, facing economic ruin and fearing a Soviet invasion, had no choice but to turn to the West. U.S. officials believed that Yugoslavia's geographic location could make a significant contribution to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and they assisted the country in its battle to survive Soviet pressure. Tito took full advantage of his position and became adept at playing the United States and the USSR against each other to enhance his country's economic and political security and to develop new initiatives at home and abroad. Yugoslavia's importance as a Communist state resisting Soviet imperialism, as a champion of a “third way” between the capitalist and Communist camps, and as a model for a different kind of state-managed economic system enabled the country to “punch above its weight” in international affairs (p. 256).By the 1970s, Yugoslavia's position had become more precarious. In this well-researched monograph, Milorad Lazic analyzes the challenges to Yugoslavia's stability posed by several internal and external factors. Tito in the final years of his life was increasingly concerned about how the country would handle the transition to a new leader. Unity and cohesion at home had always been viewed as essential to Yugoslavia's survival, but internal divisions, both ethnic and political, had accelerated. These developments magnified what the Yugoslavs saw as a constant external threat, namely, meddling or outright invasion by the Soviet Union. Tito had always been adept at balancing his country between the United States and the USSR, but Lazic posits that Tito viewed their détente in the early 1970s as a threat to that policy and hence to his country's existence. Was détente merely a façade for a spheres-of-influence agreement, “a new Yalta” (p. xvi) that would leave Yugoslavia at the mercy of the Soviet Union? The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which Tito had championed as an alternative to a bipolar international order, was also vulnerable because of the efforts by Fidel Castro's Cuba, encouraged by Moscow, to bring the NAM into the Soviet camp.Tito's solutions, according to Lazic, consisted of attempts to initiate reform at home, establish a close relationship with China, and increase support for guerrilla movements in the developing world. Yugoslavia's relationships with the United States and the USSR alternated, as they had since 1948, between estrangement and conciliation. However, Lazic also argues that Tito attempted to undermine superpower détente and instead foster a new arrangement that was international in scope. In short, Tito worked to “redefine the global order” (p. xv) to achieve his goals and preserve his legacy and his country's independence. In examining these policies, Lazic asks a series of related questions. How did the United States respond, and how did that response change from one administration to the next? How did Yugoslavia devise its overtures to China and deal with the threats posed by Cuba? What was the reaction of the Soviet Union? How did Yugoslavia attempt to preserve the integrity of the NAM and affect developments in the Third World?Although Lazic describes the internal steps Tito took to appease various dissenters at home, his primary focus is on Yugoslav foreign policy. The first crisis occurred during the Prague Spring of 1968. Tito supported the reforms but urged both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to find a peaceful solution. He condemned the subsequent Soviet invasion, as did many others in Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union responded with trade restrictions and other reprisals in a way reminiscent of 1948, although in a milder form. Tito, as he had twenty years earlier, looked to the West for support. To his dismay, the response of U.S. leaders, who were anxious to conclude arms control agreements and accelerate détente with the USSR, was muted. The Soviet Union's promulgation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, justifying Soviet intervention against other Communist states, revived old fears of a Soviet invasion.Fortunately, the United States and its allies eventually reaffirmed their commitment to Yugoslav independence and provided economic aid. These actions set the pattern for the next several years but also echoed the strategies employed by both superpowers toward Yugoslavia in previous decades. Once the United States decided to keep Tito afloat, it continued to do so, even while often disapproving of Yugoslavia's policies. Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin era alternatively wooed, berated, and attempted to destabilize Tito's regime, but a dialogue always resumed. Lazic notes the parallels to 1948 and its aftermath in general terms, but his coverage of U.S. and Soviet policies is often repetitive. His narrative would have benefited from being situated within a wider historical framework.Lazic's account of Yugoslavia's adoption of “a disruptive role toward détente” (p. xvi), in favor of a more global version that would protect smaller states, is the most innovative feature of his book. Tito's role in the NAM was long-standing, but his success in expanding Yugoslavia's influence with developing countries illuminates an important development in Cold War history. Yugoslavia's support of armed liberation movements burnished its own revolutionary credentials while making clear that the major powers could not disregard the opinions of the rest of the world. At the same time, Yugoslavia continued to participate in European forums, taking an active role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Tito viewed CSCE's protections for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of smaller states as crucial to a country like Yugoslavia. However, five months before Tito's death, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again awakened the old fear of Soviet aggression.As Lazic remarks, Yugoslavia had many identities: “East and West, European and non-aligned, socialist and independent, Mediterranean and eastern European” (p. 251). Although this mix at times fostered an incoherent strategy, Tito also skillfully used all of his country's dimensions to make it a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. In the end, regrettably, as Lazic concludes, not even Tito could dismantle “the structure of the Cold War world” (p. 257). By illuminating the role that Yugoslavia played in global affairs in the late 1960s and 1970s, this book is a welcome contribution to the literature on the Cold War

Cold war · Economic history · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Balkan and Eastern European Studies · Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics · Law