Radical Interpretation Interpreted

Bibliographic Data

ID12749827
AuthorsDonald A Davidson (corresponding author)
Year1994
Volume8
Pages121-121
Publication date1994-01-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.2307/2214166
OpenAlexW2317761528
LanguageEN
Citations received8

I'm sorry that this paper, Is Radical Interpretation Possible? (henceforth RIP), does not address question its title asks. I wish did; is a good question. I can't blame Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore for suspecting that it may turn out that perfectly kosher languages (like, for example, English) aren't radically I share suspicion. But unfortunately they never discuss, much less demonstrate inadequacy of, fairly elaborate account I have developed over years of how I think might be done. Instead they demolish, to their own satisfaction, an argument they think is mine, and then deny that any other plausible reason has been given for holding that natural languages are radically interpretable. Since argument they claim to have demolished is not mine, is a pity they did not explain why they consider reasons I do give implausible.1 RIP is largely devoted to attacking arguments of what its authors call As far as I know, I have never endorsed any argument of form T; authors of RIP refer to no text of mine that contains such an argument. Let me try to make clear relation of my views to arguments of form T. Premise 1. I do not think I have ever argued for claim that radical interpretability is a condition of interpretability.2 Not only have I never argued that every language is radically interpretable; I have not even argued that every language can be understood by someone other than its employer, since would be possible to have a private code no one else could break. I do not think, and have not argued, that radical interpretation of natural languages must be possible; I have argued only that is possible. The point of epistemic position of radical interpreter is not that exhausts evidence available to an actual interpreter, but that arguably provides sufficient evidence for interpretation. Premise 2. What, exactly, are we to put for F? The only substitution instance Fodor and Lepore ascribe to me is the principle of charity. It is true

Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology

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