Neural decoding, the Atlantis machine, and zombies

Bibliographic Data

ID12749869
AuthorsRosa Cao (0000-0002-1726-477X, Stanford University, corresponding author), Jared Warren (0000-0003-4028-7969, Stanford University)
Year2023
Volume37
Issue1
Pages69-89
Publication date2023-10-25
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpe.12181
OpenAlexW4388269485
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited45

Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super‐decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atlantis machine could one day be built. On the basis of this argument, we then argue for the rejection of robust notions of consciousness, which have generated numerous puzzles, including puzzles about the possibility of philosophical zombies. In light of the Atlantis machine, it can be seen that robust notions of consciousness do not earn their explanatory or descriptive keep. More modest concepts of consciousness are sufficient to account for all phenomena — in both senses of the term. This kind of antirobustness about consciousness is a deflationary approach to conscious experience that differs in important ways from illusionist approaches

Algorithm · Argument (complex analysis · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Decoding methods · Epistemology · Subject (documents · Thought experiment · Computer Science · Neural dynamics and brain function · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Psychology · Artificial Intelligence

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