Regional dependence and political centralization in imperial China

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12777630
AutoresChiu Yu Ko (0000-0001-8590-6159, National University of Singapore), Tuan-Hwee Sng (0000-0001-6374-0565, National University of Singapore, autor correspondente)
Ano2013
Volume54
Fascículo5-6
Páginas470-483
Data de publicação2013-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEurasian Geography and Economics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1538-7216 • E-ISSN: 1938-2863
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/15387216.2014.902752
OpenAlexW1656932039
IdiomaIT
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas26

We apply the concept of externalities to explain China’s long history of political centralization and its placement of the national capital. We argue that Eurasian geography created significant and persistent defense externalities between the Chinese regions. Opportunities to free ride imply that voluntary cooperation could not provide a long-term solution to the problem. A natural solution was to create a centralized state that would use coercion to enforce cooperation. Our model suggests that when an externality is strong, building the national capital in the region where the externality originates could be optimal. This provides a potential explanation as to why China’s capital was usually located in the strategically important north and west instead of the economically productive south and east

Archaeology · China · Economic geography · Economics · Economy · Geography · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Religion and Society Interactions