Deliberation Rules and Voting
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12802709 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Van Weelden (0000-0002-4236-1950, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 83-88 |
| Publication date | 2008-01-30 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Publisher | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00007062 |
| OpenAlex | W2122685175 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 6 |
Most models of pre-vote deliberation assume that voters send messages simultaneously. In practice, however, communication is almost always sequential. This review shows that sequential communication makes it even more difficult to induce truthful communication. Specifically, I show that for any voting rule truthful communication can only be achieved if all voters will agree on the preferred outcome in any state
Bullet voting · Cardinal voting systems · Computer security · Deliberation · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Voting · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
| Citations per year | 0.43 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2024 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |