Principal–Agent Analysis with One Agent and Two Principals

European Union Trade Negotiations with South Africa

Bibliographic Data

ID12805201
AuthorsMagdalena Frennhoff Larsén (0000-0001-6728-2645, corresponding author)
Year2007
Volume35
Issue3
Pages440-463
Publication date2007-08-07
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePolitics & Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1555-5623 • E-ISSN: 1747-1346
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00068.x
OpenAlexW1998500751
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

This article explores the utility of using principal–agent analysis—both at the level of the Commission and the European Union (EU) as a whole—to explain EU decision making in the negotiations between the European Union and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co‐operation Agreement of 1999. The article argues that the internal Commission negotiations, which are often overlooked in analyses of EU trade negotiations, need to be analyzed. It demonstrates that both the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa were heavily influenced by those Directorates‐General (DGs) most affected by these policy decisions. Moreover, the EU negotiators, who had developmental interests because of their location within DG Development, were particularly influential

Business · Commission · Economics · European commission · European union · International economics · International trade · Multilateral trade negotiations · Negotiation · Political science · Principal (computer security · European Union Policy and Governance · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

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