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The Absence of Policing and the Political Economy of Contribution and Defection

Bibliographic Data

ID12806239
AuthorsBjörn Toelstede (0000-0001-6802-7734, Linköping University, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume16
Issue4
Pages289-308
Publication date2020-05-18
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDemocracy and Security (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1555-5860 • E-ISSN: 1741-9166
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/17419166.2020.1756264
OpenAlexW3026289257
LanguageEN

Punishment is crucial to maintain contribution and to prevent defection in societies. Previous research has shown in small groups that cooperation drops (defection rises) and rises (defection drops) immediately when punishment disappears and reappears. I will discuss this effect for large groups (societies), real-world environment in the form of the absence of policing. On the contrary to small group experiments, there are contribution delays and defection delays following punishment disappearance and reappearance. The length of these delays varies and seems to depend on aspects like trust, transparency, media-behavior, or democratic affection. All these aspects have politico-economic implications

Affection · Democracy · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Punishment (psychology · Transparency (behavior · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology

Highly citedNo
Open DOIOpen Access
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