Virtue Ethics, Criminal Responsibility, and Dominic Ongwen
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12822634 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Renée Nicole Souris (0000-0002-8096-498X, United States Department of Justice, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 475-504 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-11 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Criminal Law Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1567-536X • E-ISSN: 1571-8123 |
| Publisher | Brill (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1163/15718123-01903005 |
| OpenAlex | W2947430738 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
In this article, I contribute to the debate between two philosophical traditions—the Kantian and the Aristotelian—on the requirements of criminal responsibility and the grounds for excuse by taking this debate to a new context: international criminal law. After laying out broadly Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of criminal responsibility, I defend a quasi-Aristotelian conception, which affords a central role to moral development, and especially to the development of moral perception, for international criminal law. I show than an implication of this view is that persons who are substantially and non-culpably limited in their capacity for ordinary moral perception warrant an excuse for engaging in unlawful conduct. I identify a particular set of conditions that trigger this excuse, and then I systematically examine it as applied to the controversial case of former-child-soldier-turned leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Dominic Ongwen, who is currently at trial at the International Criminal Court
Context (archaeology · Criminal law · Excuse · Moral responsibility · Political science · Sociology · Virtue · Warrant · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Torture, Ethics, and Law
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |