A new two-nested-game approach
Linking micro- and macro-scales in international environmental agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12823904 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tiziano Distefano (0000-0002-1593-6480, University of Pisa, corresponding author), Simone D’alessandro (0000-0002-5550-3313, University of Pisa) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 493-516 |
| Publication date | 2021-02-19 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Environmental Agreements Politics Law and Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1567-9764 • E-ISSN: 1573-1553 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10784-021-09526-7 |
| OpenAlex | W3129620709 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 35 |
This study investigates the effectiveness of international environmental agreements ( IEA s) and how it might be affected by the development of pro-environmental behaviour among households and firms. We propose a new framework based on a two-nested-game approach composed by: (1) a one-shot game with two asymmetric countries that negotiate the international abatement target, and (2) an evolutionary game which describes the economic structure resulting from agents’ interactions. These two games are nested because the initial economic structure determines the welfare of each country, and thus the outcome of Game 1 which, in turn, is embedded in Game 2, modifies the agents’ pay-off and the economic structure thereof. Numerical simulation outcomes suggest three key messages. First, we find that global solutions do not automatically produce the expected effects irrespective of any free-riding assumption. Second, extreme climate risks might not lead to a high abatement target in the event of marked cross-country inequality. Third, adverse consumers’ environmental attitudes might hamper the success of an IEA . The above observations entail that governments should not simply impose environmental laws. Rather, top-down policies and bottom-up interventions should be coordinated; otherwise, they might fail if undertaken in isolation. Graphic abstract
Economics · Inequality · Macro · Market economy · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Public economics · Welfare · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth · Law · Mathematics
The Calculus of Selfishness
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
Evidence for sharp increase in the economic damages of extreme natural disasters
Pro‐environmental behavior
Values, Norms, and Intrinsic Motivation to Act Proenvironmentally
Public Participation and Better Environmental Decisions
Modeling international climate change negotiations more responsibly
Feasible alternatives to green growth
The role of justice in the North–South conflict in climate change
The roles of non-state actors in climate change governance
The Regime Complex for Climate Change
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |