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Saving government failure theory from itself

Recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective

Bibliographic Data

ID12842141
AuthorsPeter J Boettke (0000-0003-4868-8898, George Mason University, corresponding author), Christopher J Coyne (0000-0003-2467-3800, Hampden–Sydney College), Peter T Leeson (George Mason University)
Year2007
Volume18
Issue2
Pages127-143
Publication date2007-03-29
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueConstitutional Political Economy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1572-9966 • E-ISSN: 1043-4062
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1007/s10602-007-9017-1
OpenAlexW2054523920
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited23

Austrian School · Economics · Government (linguistics · Government failure · Market failure · Neoclassical economics · Perspective (graphical · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Public choice · Economic Theory and Institutions · Economic Theory and Policy · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law

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  • What Should Economists Do

    James M Buchanan•Southern Economic Journal•1964

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Unique citing works10
Citations per year0,53
Citation span2007 - 2025 (19)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 10

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