How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12842228 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James M Buchanan (George Mason University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-6 |
| Publication date | 1993-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Constitutional Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1572-9966 • E-ISSN: 1043-4062 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/bf02393280 |
| OpenAlex | W2029741362 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 20 |
| References cited | 2 |
Constitutional law · Democracy · Economics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public interest · Sociology · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law
Adam Smith
Public Goods and Government Action
From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy
The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective
Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion
Rules without morals
The problem of low expectations and the principled politician
Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power
Welfare without rent seeking? Buchanan’s demogrant proposal and the possibility of a constitutional welfare state
Redistribution from a constitutional perspective
Political Learning
Making executive politics mutually productive and fair
Public goods and government action
Why the rich always stay rich (no matter what, no matter the cost)
Constitutional Political Economy
J. M. Buchanan’s contractarian constitutionalism
A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle
When does a welfare state become a road to serfdom? A model of discretion, knowledge, and political selection
A Political Economy of Income Tax Policies
Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility
| Citations per year | 0.61 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1993 - 2026 (34) |
| Highly cited | No |