Who shall judge? Hobbes, Locke, and Kant on the construction of public reason

Bibliographic Data

ID12866773
AuthorsSherrie Chamber (0000-0002-4046-1421, University of Toronto, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume2
Issue4
Pages349-368
Publication date2009-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthics & Global Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1654-6369 • E-ISSN: 1654-4951
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.3402/egp.v2i4.2135
OpenAlexW2061769694
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited4

This paper investigates early modern and enlightenment roots of contemporary ideas of public reason. I argue that concepts of public reason arose in answer to the question ‘who shall judge?’ The religious and moral pluralism unleashed by the reformation led first to the weakening of authoritative common forms of reasoning, this in turn and more importantly led to the question who is the final arbiter when a political community is faced with deep disagreement about political/moral questions. The rise of pluralism meant that to the question ‘what are the standards of public right?’ is added the corollary and equally important question ‘who judges when those standards are violated?’ The answer is that the public judges. Public reason thus refers to the role of the public as judge of public right and not simply to a set of reasons that an actual public happens to share. On this reading of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, the initial contract recedes in importance while the seat of authoritative political judgment comes to the fore

Classical liberalism · Common good · Corollary · Democracy · Enlightenment · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liberalism · Pluralism (philosophy · Political science · Politics · Public reason · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access