Reconceptualizing European Union regulatory networks
A response to Blauberger and Rittberger
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12899549 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Tarrant (Crawley Hospital), R Daniel Kelemen (0000-0002-0622-8036, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 213-222 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Regulation & Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1748-5983 • E-ISSN: 1748-5991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/rego.12135 |
| OpenAlex | W2593413457 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 7 |
This article responds to Michael Blauberger and Berthold Rittberger's article “Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks,” published in Regulation & Governance in 2015. Blauberger and Rittberger challenged our previous work on the politics of Eurocracy, disputing our argument that political considerations, not functional ones, explain the choice of bureaucratic structure in the European Union (EU). Blauberger and Rittberger suggest that functional considerations do indeed explain why policymakers sometimes prefer governance through European Regulatory Networks rather than through more centralized EU agencies, and argue that we have misunderstood the preferences of EU legislative principals. In this article, we argue that there are significant flaws in Blauberger and Rittberger's analysis on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We show that a proper interpretation of developments in both telecoms and competition lends support to our theoretical claims and not those offered by Blauberger and Rittberger
Argument (complex analysis · Bureaucracy · Competition (biology · Corporate governance · Economics · European union · International trade · Interpretation (philosophy · Law and economics · Legislature · Management · Network governance · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Work (physics · Global Financial Regulation and Crises · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
How does knowledge circulate in a regulatory network? Observing a European Platform of Regulatory Authorities meeting
Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent
Network tasks and accountability
EU Agencies and the Energy Union
Internal network structures as opportunity structures
Architecture and policy-making
Do They Matter? The Perceived Impact of European Administrative Networks
The competence‐control dilemma and the institutional design of European Union agencies
A rejoinder to Tarrant and Kelemen
EU agencies’ stakeholder bodies
The power of ‘weak’ institutions
Competition Policy in Action
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,33 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2025 (9) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |