Winning Friends and Influencing Enemies among Great Power Rivals

Beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States discussed or extended capital and technology, Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff treatment, Export–Import Bank financing, and long-term credit to the Soviet Union and China. This strategy raises three questions: First, why did the United States extend concessions to rival great powers when, under the more restrictive international environment of the 1970, it viewed Moscow's growing aggregate economic power and military capability, and especially its emerging nuclear strategic parity in ICBMs, and China's ideological challenge to the West as threats?1 Second, why, under this restrictive environment, did U.S. engagement with China and the Soviet Union make greater advances, resulting in major treaties on arms control such as the SALT Agreements, Basic Principals Agreement, Helsinki Agreement, and Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the normalization of Sino-American relations, than in previous periods? Third, and a point scholars often neglect, what role did Beijing and Moscow play in guiding American foreign policy towards China and the Soviet Union

Beijing · China · Development economics · Economics · Economy · Ideology · International trade · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Soviet union · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Law

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