How does the Chinese bureaucracy sustain economic growth without stable local political leaders? Stratified spatial mobility and the role of stable political elites in local governments

Datos Bibliográficos

ID12911178
AutoresZhu Ling (0000-0002-8180-0469, Chinese University of Hong Kong, autor de correspondencia)
Año2021
Volumen16
Número3
Páginas288-311
Fecha de publicación2021-12-19
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Asian Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 1751-6242 • E-ISSN: 1751-6234
EditorialTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/17516234.2021.2013400
OpenAlexW4200402810
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas8
Referencias citadas43

The economic influence of local political leaders, i.e. heads of local governments and party committees in subnational jurisdictions, has been highly emphasized and widely studied in China. Yet studies have also documented that these leaders experienced frequent spatial transfers and had short time horizons in each jurisdiction, which should have perverse effects on their incentives and capacities to promote the regional economy. What, then, explains the continued economic growth in China without stable local political leaders? Drawing on the stratified spatial mobility model, we emphasize the importance of the more stable political elites, who constitute a crucial buffer zone to alleviate the perverse economic effects of leaders’ frequent turnover, in sustaining long-term local development. Our empirical analyses in Jiangsu province provide evidence that supports this proposition. This study deepens our understanding of the institutional logic underlying China’s economic growth and political stability

Bureaucracy · China · Economic system · Economics · Incentive · Jurisdiction · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Political stability · Politics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · Local Government Finance and Decentralization