The compliance game
Legal endogeneity in anti-bribery settlement negotiations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12926697 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Branislav Hock (0000-0003-1123-1309, University of Portsmouth, corresponding author), Elizabeth David-Barrett (0000-0001-9761-8824, University of Sussex) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Pages | 100560-100560 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International journal of law, crime and justice (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1756-0616 • E-ISSN: 1876-763X |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ijlcj.2022.100560 |
| OpenAlex | W4308037671 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 41 |
In line with a wider expansion of global governance tools to prevent and punish corruption, the enforcement of anti-foreign bribery laws is increasing. Yet few cases are tested in court; rather, confidential negotiations and out-of-court settlements have become the norm. Many argue that this favours the enforcement authorities, since even firms with a good defence are reluctant to risk a trial when settlement appears a safer option, but there is very little evidence about what really happens in anti-foreign bribery negotiations and how companies and enforcement authorities interact during this process. Through qualitative research with participants in negotiations for settlements of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom Bribery Act, we find evidence that companies have considerable power to influence how the law is interpreted and implemented. In particular, companies use compliance programs to signal good character, while enforcement authorities willingly accept these symbols as justification for settling out of court or acting leniently. Companies therefore play a key role in shaping the law in places where it is ambiguous, an interesting example of ‘legal endogeneity’, whereby the subjects of the law help to shape its meaning
Business · Corporate governance · Economics · Endogeneity · Enforcement · Human settlement · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political science · Settlement (finance · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Finance
The profile and detection of bribery in South Korea
Policing cross-border fraud ‘Above and below the surface’
The Banality of Organizational Wrongdoing
Taking Stock of Ethics and Compliance Programs as Anticorruption Mechanisms
Certainty, Severity, or Celerity? A Mixed‐Effects Analysis of Corruption and Deterrence in the European Union
Applied Thematic Analysis
Appraising the quality of qualitative research
Ordinary People and the Rationalization of Wrongdoing
Seize the state, seize the day
Organized fraud and organizing frauds
Policing corporate bribery
Conviction seeking efficacy
Crime and Punishment
The International Endorsement of Corporate Settlements in Foreign Bribery Cases
Just a business decision? Debarment in public procurement in Canada and the United States
Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance
Mixed Motives
Beyond Endogeneity
Why the “Haves” Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Informal Dispute Resolution
Legal Intermediaries
Bargain and Bluff
A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group
The Privatization of Public Legal Rights
The Power of Second-Order Legal Consciousness
How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters
Internal Dispute Resolution
How many cases do I need
When Organizations Rule
How to Stop Harassment
Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law
The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation
Organizational Inhibitions to Addressing Occupational Fraud
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |