Directional climate justice

The normative relationship between moral claim rights and directed obligations

Bibliographic Data

ID12936997
AuthorsMarcus Hedahl (0000-0001-9794-2958, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume5
Issue0
Pages35-49
Publication date2014-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Human Rights and the Environment (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1759-7188 • E-ISSN: 1759-7196
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4337/jhre.2014.02.05
OpenAlexW4237764736
LanguageEN
Citations received1

A prominent theoretical analysis of moral claim rights holds that a right exists if and only if a corresponding directed obligation exists. Unfortunately, that traditional analysis has significant problems with a large number of apparent rights, including rights related to climate change. Many theorists take this limitation to be sufficient grounds to reject this traditional analysis, but eliminating the link between rights and directed obligations risks losing the essential, directional aspect of such rights. This theoretical impasse can be resolved by recognizing that the link between moral claim rights and directed obligations is normative rather than descriptive: a moral claim right ought to engender directed obligations, but it need not actually do so in order to be properly analysed as a right. Recognizing the normative link between rights and obligations not only solves a theoretical riddle, but also uncovers several practical consequences for our ethical understanding of climate change

Economic Justice · Law and economics · Moral obligation · Moral rights · Normative · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Climate Change and Geoengineering · Environmental law and policy · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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