On the Realist-Constructivist Controversy in Contemporary Philosophy of History

Debates between realists and anti-realists or constructivists have reappeared in philosophy of history several times. The most recent controversy between these authors has been contributing to discussions within what is sometimes called analytical philosophy of history. In the paper, I provide an overview of this controversy. I try to make explicit crucial presuppositions of the two positions and, more importantly, I argue that some realist interpretations and arguments directed against constructivism are based on misunderstanding. I offer a diagnosis as to why this is the case and suggest that the principal point of the controversy concerns the correspondence approach to historical knowledge

Constructivism (international relations · Contemporary philosophy · History of philosophy · Modern philosophy · Philosophy of history · Philosophy of science · Presupposition · Principal (computer security · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, History, and Historiography