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Common-pool resources are intrinsically unstable

Bibliographic Data

ID12960413
AuthorsTatsuyoshi Saijo (0000-0001-7216-5611, Kochi University of Technology, corresponding author), Feng Jun (0000-0002-7626-7540, Kochi University of Technology), Yutaka Kobayashi (0000-0001-6587-441X, Kochi University of Technology)
Year2017
Volume11
Issue2
Pages597-620
Publication date2017-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of the Commons (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1875-0281 • E-ISSN: 1875-0281
PublisherUbiquity Press, Ltd. (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.18352/ijc.692
OpenAlexW2693998342
LanguageEN
References cited34

Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish. In addition, we find that a system of a common-pool resource is locally unstable if there are four or more appropriators. Such instability most likely makes efficiency worse than that in the Nash equilibrium. These results indicate that equilibrium analyses might not capture the essence of the common-pool resource problem. They may also provide an answer to the unexplained pulsing behavior among appropriators and inefficiency observed in experiments

Common-pool resource · Economics · Inefficiency · Instability · Mathematical economics · Mechanics · Microeconomics · Nash equilibrium · Natural resource economics · Physics · Resource (disambiguation · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications

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