Bending or Bowing to the Rules? A Thought Experiment on Tech Firms' Responses to Misaligned Policy Goals and Legal Constraints

Bibliographic Data

ID12960573
AuthorsTobias Mettler (0000-0002-7895-7545, University of Lausanne, corresponding author)
Year2025
Publication date2025-12-11
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInformation Polity (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1875-8754 • E-ISSN: 1570-1255
PublisherIOS Press (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1177/15701255251401356
OpenAlexW4417246889
LanguageEN
References cited49

This paper examines the tension that emerges when policy objectives and regulatory requirements are misaligned. While legislation sets enforceable legal boundaries, policies often offer incentives with less legal force. Through a thought experiment, we investigate whether profit-driven tech firms adhere strictly to legal requirements or pursue financial gains despite potential penalties. Our findings challenge the simplistic assumption that the threat of penalties alone ensures compliance or risk-averse behaviour. Instead, tech firms appear to navigate these misalignments strategically, balancing potential rewards against legal exposure. The study highlights the critical need for governments to better align their regulatory efforts to guide corporate behaviour effectively

Bowing · Compliance (psychology · High tech · Incentive · Legislation · Public policy · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Occupational and Professional Licensing Regulation · Regulation and Compliance Studies

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Open DOIOpen Access