When Things Fall Apart—Conflict Dynamics and an Order Beside the State in Postcollapse Somalia

Twenty years after the state in Somalia collapsed, Somalia is still being referred to as a failed state. By using the term of state failure to describe the situation in Somalia since the breakdown of the central order and the ouster of Siad Barre in 1991, we do not only fail to adequately describe the order that has emerged from the breakdown of the state. We also use a term to describe the current situation that actually describes the period that led up to the breakdown of state structures. Against this background, it is argued in this articale that by using the concept of an order beside the state the situation in Somalia can be captured more accurately. In trying to expand this model, it is further argued that the Somali conflict needs to be understood as a multi-level conflict stystem that extends from a local to a regional and global level. KEYWORDS: Intergovernmental Authority on Developmentinternational terrorismregional security complex theorySomaliaSomalilandstate failure Notes 1. The term state failure was introduced into the debate by Helman and Ratner (1992/1993). G. Helman and S. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," Foreign Policy 89 (1992/1993): 3–20. With regard to the Horn of Africa, the term has been used prominently by Rotberg. R. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. Robert Rotberg (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), 1–49. 2. Especially as the term is far too often, particularly in the international media, equated with chaos and therefore believed to describe a status of so much anarchy that it could not be caught by a theoretical concept other than the superficial state-failure paradigm. 3. Historically, Somaliland had been a British Protectorate while the rest of Somalia had been an Italian colony until unification in 1960. Somaliland declared its independence in May 1991 and has since managed a process of democratic transition reaching a climax with parliamentary elections held in September 2005 that were considered as free and fair by international observers. See Dustin Dehéz, "Somaliland and the Issue of International Recognition," Power and Interest News Report, January 23, 2006; R. Hollemkin, S. J. Hansen, and G. M. Sørensen, "Somaliland: Elections for the Lower House of Parliament," Norwegian Centre for Human Rights Report (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, 2006), 3; S. Kibble, "Somaliland: Surviving Without Recognition; Somalia: Recognised but Failing?" International Relations 15, no. 5 (2001): 5–25. 4. Ken Menkhaus, "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts" African Affairs 106, no. 424 (1997): 357–390. 5. This term has been introduced only recently by Bellagamba and Klute. A. Bellagamba and G. Klute, Beside the State: Emergent Powers in Contemporary Africa (Cologne: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2008). 6. S. Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of 'Spillovers,'" Center for Global Development Working Paper 71 (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006). 7. Important work in this direction was undertaken but not yet conceptualized in a systematic fashion. See, M. D. McGinnis, Conflict Dynamics in a Three-Level Game: Local, National and International Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); Alex de Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989–2001," in Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 182–230. 8. Some further phenomena are making the system even more sophisticated. We believe that the interdependence of conflict levels has to reach a certain quality and complexity to be termed a conflict system. The first of these phenomena is the systemic interdependence, actors, and factors on the one hand and their relations on the other hand. See N. Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 20. The other side constitutes a conflict system, whereas the system itself is a sustained and a structured pattern of interaction among agents that can be identified on the three levels already introduced. See Barry Buzan and A. Gonzalez-Pealaez, "International Community after Iraq," International Affairs 81, no. 1 (2005): 31–52. This sustained structure of a conflict system turns into systematic violence on the ground: destruction of economic structures, killings, rapes, displacements, hunger, and political and cultural marginalization are becoming endemic. Such a microconflict can develop only when a sufficient complexity of the internal, interstate, and global conflict system exists. 9. Dustin Dehéz, Stellvertreterkrieg in Somalia, Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik 52, no. 2 (2007). 10. Kinship or clanism as an explanation of the Somali conflict was criticized most prominently by Compagnon. D. Compagnon, "Somalia Armed Units. The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & Clan-Based Factions," in African Guerillas, C. Clapham, ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 73–90. For a traditional explanation, see I. M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis. Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 1998). 11. See for a late example of such enthusiasm Basil Davidson, "Somalia: Towards Socialism," Race & Class 17, no. 1 (1975): 19–37. 12. The term dia-paying group means blood compensation. A group is held responsible for each offence conducted by one of its members. This traditional system of justice is called xeer and is still in place in various parts of the country. T. Kivimäki, Explaining Violence in Somalia (Helsinki: CTS Conflict Transformation Service, 2001); I. M. Lewis, Saints and Somalis. 13. Dustin Dehéz, "The Scarcity of Land in Somalia. Natural Resources and their Role in the Somali Conflict," Bonn International Center on Conversion, Occasional Paper III (Bonn: International Center on Conversation). 14. M. R. Ganzglass, "The Restoration of the Somali Justice System," in Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, eds. W. Clarke and J. Herbst (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 15. F. Ssereo, "Clanpolitics, Clan-Democracy and Conflict Regulation in Africa: The Experience of Somalia," The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2, nos. 3–4 (2003): 25–40. 16. "Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy" Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Series, 10. 17. Even the World Bank has come to similar conclusions: "Clan identities are not the basis for conflict; rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions." World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics (Washington: World Bank, 2005), 15. 18. For a cogent account on Somaliland's parliamentary elections see Adan Yusuf Abokor, Steve Kibble, Haroon Ahmed Yusuf and Georgina Barrett, Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections. (London: Progressio, 2006). 19. More than thirteen armed groups were active after the downfall of the regime. T. Lyons and A. Samatar, Somalia State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 77–99. 20. J. Bakonyi and K. Stuvøy, "Violence & Social Order Beyond the State: Somalia & Angola," Review of African Political Economy 104, no. 5 (2005): 359–382. 21. As has been shown systematically by Mair and others. S. Mair, Die Globalisierung privater Gewalt. Kriegsherren, Rebellen, Terroristen und Organisierte Kriminalität (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2002); P. D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without State (Oxford, 2003); J. Bakonyi, "Konturen der Gewaltordnung in Somalia," in Gewaltordnungen bewaffneter Gruppen. Ökonomie und Herrschaft nichtsaatlicher Akteure in den Kriegen der Gegenwart, eds. J. Bakonyi, S. Hensell, and Siegelberg (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2006), 98–112. With regard to the land issue, see Dehéz, "The Scarcity of Land in Somalia." 22. William Reno, "Somalia and Survival in Shadow of the Global Economy," QEH Working Papers Series, 10; Lee Cassanelli, "Somali Land Resource Issues in Historical Perspective, in Learning from Somalia, eds. W. Clarke and J. Herbst (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 67–76. 23. The Unified International Task Force (UNITAF) was originally U.S. led and later handed over to the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM). 24. M. Mwagiru, The Greater Horn of Africa Conflict System: Conflict Patterns, Strategies and Management Practices (Nairobi: USAID, 1997). 25. L. Lata, Peacemaking Conundrums in the Horn of Africa (Waterloo, ON: Project Ploughshares, 2003). 26. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace," Africa Briefing 11 (2002):7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1822. 27. Martin Plaut and Dominique Berdal-Jacquin, Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War. (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2004). 28. It should be noted that we analyze the TNG's case primarily to illuminate our case. The TNG has collapsed and beenreplaced by the Transitional Federal Government that relocated from Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, to Somalia, in July 2005. It nearly lost power after militias belonging to the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 and could be saved only by a large-scale Ethiopian intervention. 29. Mogadishu faction leaders signed a joint declaration in December 2002 in which they announced that they would not support the TNG in what could be understood as an anti-Ethiopian coalition. Likewise, Mogadishu factions, dominated by the Hawiye-clan, did not support the newly formed TFG, which they not only perceived as being an Ethiopian puppet regime but also as dominated by the Darood-clan from the northeast. ICG, "Salvaging Somalia's Chance for Peace." 30. The rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt is another conflict endangering the stability in the Horn of Africa and is caused by two important factors: First, Egypt is a leading the Arab League and a Muslim state, while Ethiopia is the regional power in the Horn and dominated by orthodox Christianity. Second, both countries compete over the use of the Nile water. U. Terlinden and T. Debiel, Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development (Bradford, UK: University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 2004); World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), 15. 31. ICG, "Biting the Somali Bullet," Africa Report 79 (2004):13, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2698&l=1. 32. Dustin Dehéz, "Crisis Region Eastern Africa: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development in an Environment of Latent Conflict," in Africa and Fortress Europe. Threats and Opportunities, ed. B. Gebrewold (Aldershot: Ashgate), 21–35. 33. Alex de Waal, "The Politics of Destabilisation in the Horn, 1989–2001, in Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, ed. Alex de Waal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 212. 34. M. K. Juma, "The Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the East African Community," in From Cape to Congo. Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges, eds. M. Baregu and C. Landsberg (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2003), 231–235; M. K. Juma "The Sudan," Dealing With Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organizations, ed. J. Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 185–214. 35. The debate on Somalia's role in the structure of global actions terrorist networks focused on one central issue: could the country, as a Muslim dominated state without a national government, be a suitable environment for terrorists to find shelter? While some scholars have argued that the absence of state order, a general climate of lawlessness, and the predominately informal economy were making Somalia a suitable and inviting a safe haven. T. Mentan, Dilemmas of Weak States. Africa and Transnational Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). Others have stressed that it is exactly the total absence of state structures that makes it unsuitable for terrorists to hide and that a minimum of state structures is necessary to attract the attention of terrorist networks. To a certain extent this controversy misses the mark: Somalia is not, as we have outlined, a failed state. While considering the role of Somalia in international terrorist networks, we must be aware that we are actually assessing two different entities: Somaliland being a weak state on its path to fully established statehood as it is still awaiting international recognition, and the South and East of Somalia that has experienced further fragmentation in the past two decades, where some order beside the state is slowly emerging. Furthermore, not at all times are terrorist looking for a safe haven that provides shelter; in order to understand the role Somalia is playing in the global terrorist network, it is indispensable to clearly distinguish between the different stages for terrorist activities. While at some points terrorists may be looking for some sort of shelter, Somalia could be a place to hide for only a very short period of time, as its clan-structure makes it very inhospitable to foreigners. At other stages, when terrorists are planning and preparing attacks on Western targets, Somalia might be chosen to acquire weapons, but more sophisticated planning and preparing requires an infrastructure that provides access to money, material, and communication networks. Although all this can be obtained in Somalia, it is much easier to acquire these assets in a less informal economy. Somaliland and the Kenyan Northern Frontier District, where the economy can be described as not-informal/not-formal (P. D. Little, Somalia. Economy Without State). are hence much more suitable for terrorists in the process of preparing attacks, which indicates that Somaliland in its difficult transition period is much more vulnerable to the penetration of terrorist networks. This has meanwhile been recognized by some senior analysts in the United States, who consider Somaliland's capital Hargeysa a key location in the war on terror. S. J. Morrison and P. Lyman, "Countering the Terrorist Threat in Africa," in Rising U.S. Stakes in Africa. Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S.–Africa Policy, ed. W. Kansteiner (Washington, DC: 2004), 104–118. 36. Dustin Dehéz, "Die Vereinten Nationen und Somalia:Vorhersehbares Scheitern oder vielversprechender Neuanfang?" Vereinte Nationen 57, no. 3 (2009): 117–122. 37. Ken Menkhaus, Governance without Governemtn in Somalia: Terrorism: Spoliers, State Building, and the Politics of Copinig," International Security 31, no. 3 (2006)

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