Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa

From Fomuc to Micopax

Bibliographic Data

ID12976249
AuthorsAngela Meyer (0000-0003-4120-3827, Organisation for International Dialogue and Conflict Management, corresponding author)
Year2009
Volume2
Issue2-3
Pages158-174
Publication date2009-11-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueAfrican Security (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1939-2206 • E-ISSN: 1939-2214
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/19362200903362075
OpenAlexW2069706154
LanguageEN
Citations received9

This article is an analysis of Central African regional conflict management. It refers, in particular, to the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC) peace operation in the Central African Republic. After a short overview of this operation, the article analyzes the reasons why its capacity to create self-sustaining security has been rather limited. It hereby focuses on the underlying interests of states and governments involved that have largely compromised the mission's ability to serve the population's needs. This gap between rhetoric and reality raises the question of whose security is actually protected. The article concludes by discussing the major challenges for Force Multinationale en Centrafrique's successor, Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine (MICOPAX). KEYWORDS: CEMACECCASFOMUCMICOPAXsecurityCentral African Republic Notes 1Force Multinationale en centrafrique 2Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine 1. From 2002 to 2004, the command over FOMUC was assumed by General Jean Claude Ella Ekogha, and from 2004 until the mission's end in July 2008 by General Roger-Auguste Bibaye Itandas, who are both Gabonese. 2. “Ni ingérence, ni indifférence.” 3. In 1997, the newly elected French government of Lionel Jospin announced a change in France's Africa policy with the progressive withdrawal of French troops and closing of military bases in African countries. At the same time, it launched in 1998 the capacity-building program RECAMP to reinforce African capabilities in the field of peacekeeping. See http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/budget/plf2000/a1863-03.asp (accessed July 1, 2009). 4. United Nations Security Council, “Ninth Report of the Security-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)” (S/2000/24, January 14, 2000), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/239/78/IMG/N0023978.pdf?OpenElement. 5. During the rebellion against President Laurent Kabila, Jean-Pierre Bemba used the CAR as base for operations and economic activities. See Denis Tull, Christiane Kayser, “Friedensschlüsse und kein Ende der Gewalt in Sicht: Der Krieg in Zentralafrika,” in Afrika Jahrbuch 2002, eds. Rolf Hofmeier, Andreas Mehler (Opladen: Leske + Budrich Verlag, 2003): 44–56. For the complex and controversial relationship between Ange-Félix Patassé and Jean-Pierre Bemba and Laurent Kabila, see Andreas Mehler, “Zentralafrikanische Republik 2000,” in Afrika Jahrbuch 2000, ed. Rolf Hofmeier (Opladen: Leske + Budrich Verlag, 2001): 219–223. 6. There are two main regional economic communities in Central Africa. CEMAC is the successor of a customs union (UDEAC) set up shortly after decolonization. Its members are Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Equatorial Guinea. Its major aim is to establish an economic and a monetary union. ECCAS has been founded in 1983 as part of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) backed Lagos Plan of Action in view of preparing on the regional level for continent-wide integration. Its member states are the same as for CEMAC, with the additions of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Sao Tome and Principe; Rwanda withdrew its membership in 2007. Since the comprehensive reform process launched in 1998, ECCAS's mandate also covers peace and security issues. As third regional community in Central Africa, the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) remains largely unimportant, due to lack of political will, weak institutional capacities, and divergences between its three member states Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, all affected by the regional conflicts. 7. See European Commision, “EU Relations with the Central African Republic,” available http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=cf&type=long&lng=en (accessed June 26, 2008). 8. United Nations Development Programme, Rapport National sur le Développement Humain—République Centrafricaine: Renforcer le Capital Social et la Sécurité Humaine: Un Impératif pour la Refondation de l'Etat Centrafricain (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2008). 9. The following facts and figures on armed groups in the CAR are based on Steven Spittaels and Filip Hilgert, Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic (Antwerp: International Peace Information Service, 2009); United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in the Central African Republic” (S/2009/66, February 3, 2009), available http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/219/11/PDF/N0921911.pdf?OpenElement. 10. United Nations Development Programme, Rapport National sur le Développement Humain. 11. On the issue of “sovereignty-boosting” see also Fredrik Söderbaum, “Modes of Regional Governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, Sovereignty Boosting, and Shadow Networks,” Global Governance 10 (2004) as well as the article of Maxi Schoeman and Marie Muller in this issue. (pp. 175–192). 12. See also Angela Meyer, “Regional Integration and Security in Central Africa—Assessment and Perspectives 10 Years After the Revival,” Egmont Paper 25 (2008), http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep25.pdf (accessed April 25, 2009). 13. International Crisis Group (ICG), “République Centrafricaine: Anatomie d'un Etat fantôme,” Rapport Afrique 136 (2007): 1–45. 14. Andreas Mehler, “Zentralafrikanische Republik 2003,” in Afrika-Jahrbuch 2003, eds. Rolf Hofmeier and Andreas Mehler (Opladen: Leske + Budrich Verlag, 2004): 212–218. 15. The African Union, as well as many other countries, the UN, and the European Union, however, condemned the violent seizure of power by François Bozizé. They recognized his regime only after the 2005 elections that they endorsed as free and fair. 16. African Union, Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (Sirte, 28.2.2004), article 6, available: http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.Af%20 Def%20Sec.pdf. 17. Article 3 of MICOPAX's mandate from June 12, 2008. 18. This information is partially based on interviews by IPIS with MICOPAX technical advisor in Bangui in November 2008. Spittaels and Hilgert, Mapping Conflict Motives. 19. MINURCAT has been set up in September 2007 by the Security Council Resolution 1778. Composed of uniformed and civilian staff, the mission shall contribute to enhancing security in the region of operation in view of ensuring the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. 20. France at the United Nations, Communiqué—Chad and the Central African Republic: Action by France—24/04/09, available: http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article3847 (accessed August 14, 2009). 21. UN Security Council, “Resolution 1778: The Situation in Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Subregion” (S/RES/1778, September 25, 2007), available: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/516/15/PDF/N0751615.pdf?OpenElement. 22. United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, “MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad,” available: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minurcat/index.html (accessed August 1, 2009). 23. In accordance with UN Security Councile Resolution 1778. 24. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, “The New Regionalism Approach,” Politeia 17, no. 3 (1998): 9. 25. The concept of “regionness,” developed by Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, refers to the “political ambition of establishing regional coherence and regional identity.” The level of “regionness” “defines the position of a particular region or regional system in terms of regional coherence, identity and actor-capacity.” See BjörnHettne, “Globalism, Regionalisalism and Interregionalism,” in Globalization, Development and Human Security, eds. Anthony McGrew and Nana K. Poku (Cambridge: Polity, 2007): 25–47; Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy 5, no. 3. (2000): 457–472

Conflict management · Development economics · Economics · International relations · Peacebuilding · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Law · Peacebuilding and International Security · Public Administration

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