Syria's State Bourgeoisie

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 The principal exception as of early July 2012 is the apparent defection of Manaf Tlas, son of former Defense Minister, Mustapha Tlas, and a commander of one of the elite brigades in the Syrian Republican Guard. Notably, General Tlas was sidelined or 'sent home' in summer 2011 after exhibiting a critical attitude toward the regime's handling of the uprising. Other defectors with seemingly important 'official' positions, including ambassadors, are usually not part of the regime core. Cautious interpretation of every case is advised. 2 'Para-official' refers to individuals related to others that actually have an official position within the state apparatus. Often, they exercise power themselves, depending on their personality and proximity to the levers of power. 3 Close relatives of those who hold power within the state—these individuals hold no official position but often wield considerable power while exhibiting equal devotion to the regime. A modal example is Rami Makhlouf, the president's cousin who has no official position but is considered one of the most influential men in Syria. 4 Perhaps the best example of such partnerships can be gleaned from the dismal results of Investment Law #10 of 1991 and the numerous presidential decrees that directly preceded the law. See Khalid Abdul Nour (Citation2000) al-Qita' al-Khas fi Thill al-Himaya [The Private Sector in the Shadow of Protection], Paper No. 13, 2000 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April 25); and Raymond Hinnebusch (Citation1996) Democratization in the Middle East: The Evidence from the Syrian Case, in: Gerd Nonneman (ed.) Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspective, pp. 153–166 (London: Lynne Rienner). 5 The difference here speaks to the kind of economic development the regime pursued, one that is marked by a severely controlled pattern of economic growth that prevents the emergence of powerful industrial social forces. Alternatively, industrial deepening would have required more far-sighted economic planning that subordinates political imperatives, as well as a more open political and economic system that does not hinder ingenuity and other price-setting mechanisms. For a comparative account of the Syrian case in this regard, see David Waldner (Citation1999) State Building and Late Development (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); for a comparative account on the requirements and challenges of industrial deepening drawn from cases in Latin America, see Guillermo O'Donnell (Citation1979) Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California). 6 Although official statistics do not exist on class distribution in Syria, independent analysts and economists who work on demographic distribution, urbanization and labor concur with the figures presented in the book by Volker Perthes (Citation1995) The Political Economy of Syria Under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris), which remains the best rough estimate for class distribution; see especially, table III.2 on p. 118. Among economists interviewed on this topic are Rizqallah Hilan, Arif Dalila, Sa'id Nabulsi, Nabil Marzouq and Nasir Nasir. 7 The trio of Uthman al-'A'idi, Sa'ib Nahhas and Abdul Rahman al-'Attar often are referred to as the first batch of the new private bourgeoisie in Syria. However, several other individuals have surpassed both their reputation and their wealth, including relatives of the Asad, Makhlouf, Shalish and other politically prominent families. 8 The wealthiest individuals, groups and families in Syria usually are involved in the commerce, service and manufacturing sectors, in both exports and imports. The Sanqar family is an example: three enterprising brothers, who are involved in the importation of luxury cars, own restaurants and provide the local market with various agricultural products. The Sa'ib Nahhas group is perhaps the epitome of business diversification in Syria, spanning nearly all sectors, including commerce, agriculture, industry, transportation and tourism. Whereas Nahhas declined personal interviews, the records of his businesses are made public through the variety of brochures published by his office in Damascus. 9 It is noteworthy that the category of the state bourgeoisie is not a distinct one in the Syrian public's imagination, discourse or creative production. More often than not, people refer to such categories in political not economic terms such as 'the officials' (al-mas'ulin) or, less often, 'men of the authority' (rijal al-silta) even if they are depicting their wealth. Alternatively, they lump the state bourgeoisie and the private bourgeoisie under the term 'the parasitic class' (al-tabaqa al-tufailiyya). Although some academics and social critics use the literal term for the state bourgeoisie' (burjwaziyyat al-dawla), it is largely absent from visual, print and audible media. The significance of this lack can be traced back to the absence of open discourse on such matters: most social sectors in Syria take the abuse of political authority to be the primary culprit, with the economic enrichment derived therefrom being a consequence of political corruption. The abstraction involved here is linked to the absence of open discourse on the regime and perhaps to the fear of cutting too close to the bone by inadvertently relating corruption to the regime directly. 10 See Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114; and Alan Richards & John Waterbury (Citation1996a) A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press), p. 201. 11 See John Waterbury (Citation1991) Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(1), pp. 1–17. 12 See John Waterbury (Citation1991) Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(1), pp. 13–14. 13 The closest would be the power struggle of 1984 between President al-Asad and his brother Rif'at and the succession crisis that preceded and directly proceeded Asad's death in June of 2000. For more on the infamous Rif'at al-Asad challenge, see Patrick Seale (Citation1988) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris). 14 A high level public sector official was most direct in relaying to me the existential dilemma many of them face in that sector: 'we have committed grave mistakes in the past, and people will not remember who among us was not directly involved... neither will the regime excuse us now for abandoning it.' (Author interview, Damascus, June 1, 1999.) Other interviews with high-level public sector officials were infinitely more discrete and more useless in interpreting their real attitudes. The above-quoted individual started with a typical Syrian resigned attitude by telling me 'They will all lie to you, they are all scared to death of saying what's in their heads... sometimes when we are drinking together, I have to remind them that I am [a friend].' (The closest would be the power struggle of 1984 between President al-Asad and his brother Rif'at and the succession crisis that preceded and directly proceeded Asad's death in June of 2000. For more on the infamous Rif'at al-Asad challenge, see Patrick Seale (Citation1988) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris)) Many of those we could call members of the state bourgeoisie—especially those not tied directly to the regime—would like to be dissociated from the state, but know well that the consequences are most uncertain, both economically in terms of their livelihood and politically in terms of their security under changing circumstances. The import of such attitudes is latent: if or when the current regime falls apart, few would come to its rescue if they could afford otherwise. In the meantime, state employees—especially those outside the military and security apparatuses—would hold on steadfastly to the public and governmental sectors. They are rational actors in a system that has managed to align calculated rational behavior with the regime's most pressing interest: its survival through state dominance. 15 Hostility toward the regime should be differentiated from criticism of the regime: the regime would tolerate criticism, especially since the late 1990s, so long as the president and sect are not the object, but it would not, and has not since 1970, tolerated any signs of hostility. Thus, while hostility is almost impossible to observe publicly, it is ubiquitous in private, especially among the social sectors that have seen their fortunes decrease dramatically and among those who have had their political voices castrated: primarily the urbanized working classes and the Islamists—both categories dwell in more traditional urban quarters—but also within society at large, including the legions of disaffected youths without job opportunities and civil society advocates. As Lisa Wedeen points out, it is difficult to discern what people really feel, but the manifestation of increasing dissatisfaction in the less-controlled media, and in 'encrypted' novels, art, cartoons, televisions shows and films, is unmistakable; see further Lisa Wedeen (Citation1999) Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press). More often than not, the culprit is a public official, even if he is thoroughly humanized and his objectionable behavior diluted, such as in the famous television sitcom 'Yawmiyat Mudir 'Aam' [The Daily Life of a General (Public Sector) Manager]. The message is clearer in other works, such as the film Nujoum al-Lail, which symbolically depicts the domination of cities by unsophisticated individuals (from the countryside) who are ruthless plunderers. 16 See, for instance, Riad Saif, Safqat 'Uqud al-Khilyawi [The Cellular Telephone Contracts], a controversial paper presented by MP Riad Saif to the Syrian Parliament on August 14, 2001. The paper exposes the scandal of the cellular telephone contracts between the government and individuals affiliated with the state but acting as private businessmen. These contracts proved to be extremely costly for the government and highly profitable for the local contractors, who belong to the Makhluf family, Hafiz al-Asad's in-laws. The telecom market is only the latest to be seized by men of power and wealth in Syria, by now a predictable occurrence with regard to lucrative new markets. 17 See Manfred Halpern (Citation1963) The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press); and Alan Richards & John Waterbury (Citation1996b) Contradictions of State-Led Growth, in: Alan Richards & John Waterbury (eds.) A Political Economy of the Middle East, pp. 205–221 (Boulder: Westview Press). 18 See Michael C. Hudson (Citation1999) Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 15; and Hudson (Citation1987) Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics, Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 22(2), pp. 157–171. Perhaps no other country in the Middle East fits Hudson's designation of a mukhabarat state better than Syria (the literal translation is 'security services state,' which refers to the ubiquity of such agencies). 19 Author interviews with former Ba'thists, all of whom acknowledged being disillusioned with the post-1970 gradual marginalization of socialist Ba'thist ideology; interviews were conducted in Damascus, Aleppo and Hama, August 1998 to June 1999. These observers make a distinction between what Hinnebusch considers the 'pillars of the Ba'th' (including army, party and bureaucracy) and the actual dominance of the security apparatuses that undermined the authority of the Ba'th party qua ideological party. See further R. Hinnebusch (Citation1990) Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 144–152. 20 Independent Syrian analysts who experienced the tense period leading up to, and proceeding, the Corrective Movement in 1970 openly admit that President al-Asad had no choice but to tolerate the excesses of his aides. It was either to allow those who surrounded him to loot, or to suffer along with them at the hands of competing factions and societal forces. Others are far more critical. They claim that Asad knew well what he was doing and opened the door quite willingly and widely to the kind of corrupt behavior that the Ba'th officially condemned henceforth. The latter critics emphasize that this was unavoidable, but not an accident. The Asad faction of the Ba'th had alienated the more refined Ba'thists and attracted the careerist and more self-serving individuals. These, they claim, were the people with whom Asad had surrounded himself since he occupied his post as Defense Minister in 1966. The behavior of the top political elite in the Ba'th party after 1970, according to one informant, reflects the 'unfolding of their yet unsatisfied desires... political, financial, social, and sexual.' Fortunately, or perhaps not, Asad's principal desire was political power, as opposed to the assorted bag of desires that some of his aides pursued. This, they claim, kept him focused and allowed him to manipulate those who surrounded him. He made sure, one critic claims, that they individually amounted to very little in terms of power: 'without him, they were all zeros, and they all knew it, all the way up to the most powerful among them. Only when you put him in the picture, as the number "1," do these zeros acquire meaning and power.' But by no means was Asad personally opposed to much of their behavior, critics assert in responding to the common thesis of a good man surrounded by a nasty bunch. Short of encouraging it, he protected many of the most notorious 'men of the regime' for decades. These men, who kept by Asad's side, became the cornerstones of the state bourgeoisie in the 1990s. Source: Various conversations and interviews with independent Syrian critics, Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, December 1998. See also Hanna Batatu (Citation1999) Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 230–233. 21 Such committees would be entitled 'Commission of Inquiry into Illicit Gains.' See Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, p. 215. 22 Only when such figures cross a political line do their economic activities become subject to scrutiny, as with the removal of Bashir Najjar from his security post in 1999. 23 See, in Batatu's Syria's Peasantry, the chapter entitled The Causal Factors Behind the Ascent of the Lesser Rural or Village Notability, pp. 155–162, particularly the section on The Rural Penetration of the State Bureaucracy, p. 160. 24 Though a minority in Syria, Christians, comprising around 11 percent of the population, historically have been among the more privileged classes, largely because of the kind of professions they have taken up and the kind of support they received either from relatives abroad or from foreign powers in the past two centuries. For more on minorities and their historical presence, see Nikolaos Van Dam (Citation1996) The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party (London: I.B. Tauris); and Philip Khoury (Citation1987) Syria and the French Mandate: the Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 25 See Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, pp. 218–224. 26 That requirement may apply only to those in the top rungs of the state bourgeoisie, if only for the small number of those usually understood to be in that category; see Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114. 27 These levels of power and the discussion below are based on B. Haddad (Citation2012a), Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 28 Some individuals in this category officially have left the political scene but remain intimately involved in political decision-making and processes of allocating economic surplus and resources. Prominent among such individuals is Muhammad al-Khuly, former president Hafiz al-Asad's brother-in-law, and other members of the Asad family, particularly his own brothers and their offspring. 29 See Timeline: Syria, BBC News. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east, accessed December 27, 2001. 30 It is reported that Maher al-Asad, Bashar's brother, who occupies increasingly important roles within the military, shot his brother-in-law, Asif Shawkat, during a dispute over how to proceed after Asad's death in June 2000. Although a well-known incident among most observers, this episode was never written about in the Syrian press. interviews, Damascus, 2001. primarily in the members of this usually the are to take over the businesses of a of private sector Often, they into partnerships that up in private as with the that was by MP was on after a on August and was with See August 8 and p. and Haddad Business as in Middle East See (Citation2000) State and Private Sector in The Politics of and Development (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. in this the in of the since as well as those in along the in the early have in that allow them to well as by as for a to some of the within the military the of such at the of the to the high level their own who around with them. Such have made corruption at far more and far less to be the see (Citation1999) [The General and for its Paper No. Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April in which he the of the Syrian that back to Syrian officials and relatives of the top elite who wield power through such or through by their It is no that like and have of wealth and power as a of Syria's in and of their and Such high-level do not, and by They from both and that an in and of wealth and their in the of regime and after Hafiz al-Asad's which left most in and allowed the security to a more in Syria's interviews with former public sector 1999. See Authoritarian and Democratization in the Middle A of the of such individuals is the of in which they remain either as members of the or within the elite regime often as or of the that Syria. and for instance, the members the largely because of of the in the 2000 of the members on term refers to between two one party is by the The of such is to the It is important to here that some economic public sector would for the dominance of the public but these are individuals who have largely kept to the and by the public they on their as opposed to other public sector who from a variety of opportunities and abuse who have not into the private Thus, they have a real and in their by the public Their behavior and and at wealth, them from those we to be part of the state See Nabil Marzouq and Paper No. 1998 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, p. General social have from percent in the early to percent in the early 1990s, and along with them the for public and government sector Nabil Marzouq and Paper No. 1998 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, p. the these and other that are not to those in the private August 27, the government a 25 percent in the and of public sector their they percent of the Syrian of 17 The such in 30 percent but was up by in For more on the state of the Syrian labor see Sa'id (Citation1999) the of Syrian Paper No. Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, April pp. See (Citation1999) [The Economic of the of Paper No. Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, See Twilight of the State and Richards & Political Economy of the Middle East, pp. In this to has members of the state bourgeoisie toward if not with various top officials in the and security apparatuses in Syria. See Patrick Seale (Citation1990) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of Press); and Timeline: Syria, BBC News. the by the BBC the section as one of other in a Syria that from 1970 to 2001. Minister was as a of both the Ba'th Party and its official that him of being in corruption and of with the and of the party and a of the to the reputation of the party and state and to the A long of and other officials was and people were or by the among those were the former Minister for Economic and Minister of was reported to have committed while under See the No. p. In and in the Syrian under Asad in after the Corrective power in the hands of the often at the of all other of In the has been by the Ba'th made up of the most powerful members of the state See the on the of the Syrian after in Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, pp. For various see Dalila, The General See Perthes, Political Economy of Syria, p. 114. For further of the of the economic published by the Economic Sciences Association in the to late 1990s, a when such criticism at the public sector was by the See especially the 1998 and the 2000 including Arif (Citation2000) al-Qita' fi al-Himaya [The Sector in Syria: to Paper No. 14, 2000 Conference Series (Damascus: Economic Sciences Association, For instance, within the public sector usually is tied to in the Ba'th a position that of with Other the of for those who among the most members of the interviews with public sector in the and Damascus. Various conversations between the and former public sector officials including an with a former who as an for the April 1999. Such is without because of the political and of such partnerships between officials and private businessmen. Various conversations between the and former public sector officials including an with a former who as an for the April 1999. Such is without because of the political and of such partnerships between officials and private The and of their private business who usually own their are directly by their in often with no more than a call that officials to or to allow of through Author interviews, Damascus, 1999. to a former official at the of Syria, such can be best in since no of government would this desire for being acknowledged as a of the private prominent business including figures like are to any with or not they work like al-'Attar would even from other who are to been the of officials or security service It is such attitudes toward the new bourgeoisie and its parasitic many among the state bourgeoisie would like to with and other who to remain Damascus, and Aleppo, April here is that al-'Attar himself is considered by most as a of the new bourgeoisie as well as a among the who with the state in the including Sa'ib Nahhas declined to be and in The of this attitude toward the new or society at is well even in the especially the of the and The Ba'th was published the More of this attitude in the two that were after Bashar's the economic and the Though they are in both were along with the of civil society in 2001. See Business as It is important to emphasize the rational for a regime and not the to The is even within the regime are to face a to that to in the regime in case of a regime the behavior of the regime first and and not

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