It’s a matter of confidence. Institutions, government stability and economic outcomes
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12989151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Luca Bettarelli (0000-0002-2525-2453, Université Libre de Bruxelles, corresponding author), Michela Cella (0000-0003-0158-7651, University of Milano-Bicocca), Giovanna Iannantuoni (University of Milano-Bicocca), Elena Manzoni (0000-0003-0223-8760, University of Verona) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 709-738 |
| Publication date | 2020-12-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economia Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1973-820X • E-ISSN: 1120-2890 |
| Publisher | Springer Science+Business Media (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s40888-020-00210-8 |
| OpenAlex | W3116526905 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
In this paper we analyse the effect of constitutional structures over policy outcomes. In particular, we exploit the heterogeneity in parliamentary systems deriving from the presence and the use of the confidence vote to investigate whether stable and unstable parliamentary systems behave differently in terms of the policies they implement. This finer partition of parliamentary systems allows us to identify effects that are more robust than the ones previously discussed in the literature. We show that the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems documented in previous works is driven by a difference between presidential and stable parliamentary systems. We suggest that possible transmission channels are legislative cohesion and (the absence of) selection
Cohesion (chemistry · Economics · Exploit · Government (linguistics · Legislature · Partition (number theory · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public economics · Stability (learning theory · Computer Science · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
The Failure of Presidential Democracy
Fairness and Redistribution
Constitutions, Politics, and Economics
Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation when the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable is Weak
Limited information estimators and exogeneity tests for simultaneous probit models
Electoral Systems and Public Spending
Political instability and economic growth
Fitting Fully Observed Recursive Mixed-process Models with cmp
Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes
An analysis of the price escalation of non-linear water tariffs for domestic uses in Spain
The economic effects of constitutions
Do the Right Thing
Constitutional choices
Constitutional Design for Divided Societies
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
Replacing Cabinet Ministers
Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971
Comparative Dynamics of Parliamentary Governments
| Highly cited | No |
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