The Need for Quinean Pragmatism in the Theory of History

Bibliographic Data

ID13001801
AuthorsJonathan Gorman (0000-0002-1855-6643, Queen's University Belfast, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume8
Issue2
Publication date2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091
PublisherAssociazione Pragma (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.4000/ejpap.645
OpenAlexW2594840101
LanguageEN
References cited29

I present the history of philosophy, and history more generally, as a context of ideas, with respect to which philosophers and historians share concerns about the meaning of the texts they both use, and where for some there is a principled contrast between seeing meaning in quasi-mathematical terms (“a philosophical stance”) or in terms of context (“a historical stance”). I introduce this imagined (but not imaginary) world of ideas as temporally extended. Returning to my early research into the epistemic problems of historiography, I present my view that foundational was meaningful language in a shared world, and I display some difficulties found in handling the “wholeness” of historical accounts. I came to realise that it was epistemic opposition between historical accounts that mattered. I concluded that analytical philosophy was wrong to assume that individual sentences were free-standing meaningful units that could be juxtaposed with others at whim, and that an understanding of the rational grounds for determining relevance was needed. In order to make sense of this I used Quine’s conception of the “web of belief,” and noted that a historical account could be treated as a “unit of empirical significance” in his terms. I observe that, although the epistemic problems of history arose for me before I considered his pragmatic position, nevertheless attention to those problems required me to adopt the Quine-based form of pragmatism I describe. I came to realise that I had wrongly adopted a synchronic view of the Quinean web, thereby adopting a “philosophical stance.” Rather, the web should be conceived in diachronic terms as a rolling web, so forming history itself. It is wrong to think that language started in atomistic terms so that, following Aristotle, it first consisted of simple concepts forming sentences of brief and narrow subject-predicate form. Instead, early communications took the form of oral traditions usually in narrative form. Meaningful wholes such as historical accounts are conceptually prior to atomistic sentences and need to be seen in extended temporal terms, so that an Aristotelian subject-predicate metaphysics is implausible. Quine’s pragmatism framed and facilitated my historical stance despite the unashamed philosophical stance that he adopted

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Context (archaeology · Contextualism · Epistemology · Historiography · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistic turn · Linguistics · Meaning (existential · Political science · Pragmatism · Quine · History · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, History, and Historiography · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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