Axioms, Definitions, and the Pragmatic a priori
Peirce and Dewey on the “Foundations” of Mathematical Science
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13002010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bradley C Dart (0009-0003-4304-832X, Memorial University of Newfoundland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091 |
| Publisher | Associazione Pragma (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.4000/11p4u |
| OpenAlex | W4398207605 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
Peirce and Dewey were generally more concerned with the process of scientific activity than purely mathematical work. However, their accounts of knowledge production afford some insights into the epistemology of mathematical postulates, especially definition and axioms. Their rejection of rationalist metaphysics and their emphasis on continuity in inquiry provides the pretext for the pragmatic a priori – hypothetical and operational assumptions whose justification relies on their fruitfulness in the long run. This paper focuses on the application of this idea to the epistemology of definitions and an account of progress in mathematics, although it has broader implications for the study of conceptual change and the function and basis of presuppositions in the sciences
A priori and a posteriori · Axiom · Calculus (dental · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Pragmatism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Medicine · Philosophy
Inventing Temperature
A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori
Fallibilism and necessity
Hans Reichenbach's and C.I. Lewis's Kantian philosophies of science
Proofs and Refutations
Proofs and Refutations (I)
John Dewey, Empiricism, and Experimentalism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics
Conceptual Change and the Philosophy of Science
| Highly cited | No |
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