Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final Opinion
A Transcendental Feature and an Empirical Constraint
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13002147 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron B Wilson (0000-0002-8082-9040, South University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091 |
| Publisher | Associazione Pragma (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.4000/ejpap.1319 |
| OpenAlex | W2909863838 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
Idealist and Strong Empiricist approaches to Peirce’s thought are irreconcilable so far as an Idealist interpretation commits Peirce to some form of a priori knowledge, particularly a priori knowledge of the conditions of empirical knowledge. However, while I favor the strong empiricist approach, I agree that there is something like a “condition for the possibility of empirical knowledge” in Peirce, and that this lies with his famous conjecture that, with enough time and experience, there would be a “final result” of all inquiry – “the Final Opinion.” Though some argue that this is mainly a regulative assumption or intellectual hope in Peirce, I contend that he is committed to it as an empirical hypothesis which we should provisionally accept. As an empirical hypothesis, it is not a transcendental constraint on knowledge, though it can be considered a transcendental feature (following Sacks’ (1997) distinction). That is, the thesis explains how knowledge is possible, but the epistemic status of the thesis itself is dependent on the course of experience. Here I explain how it is an empirical thesis and I explain the empirical considerations Peirce thinks support it. Though Peirce should not be considered a transcendental idealist in any robust sense, I give reasons for why he could still be considered a sort of absolute idealist
A priori and a posteriori · Empirical research · Empiricism · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Pragmatism · Transcendental number · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |