A Proposed Taxonomy of Realism in Conceptual Frameworks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13002160 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paolo Valore (University of Milan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2036-4091 • E-ISSN: 2036-4091 |
| Publisher | Associazione Pragma (PUBLISHER • IT) |
| DOI | 10.4000/ejpap.2331 |
| OpenAlex | W3149494283 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
One of the complications of a clear evaluation of different positions called “realism” in metaphysics and ontology is discrepancy in terminology and variance of basic intuitions inherent this notion. I recommend a taxonomy that distinguishes three kinds of variance: variance in the sets of conditions for a philosophical position to be acknowledged as actual realism, variance in strength and variance in conceptual frameworks. Within this last case, I propose to differentiate realism in epistemology, in ontology, and in metaphysics, intersecting these three variants with the local/global realism dichotomy. The taxonomy here provided aims at being meta-philosophical; expressive enough for a fine-grained articulation of different philosophical positions in the recent debate, including the question of metaphysical grounding; and impartial, with no need to be connected to the defense of one form or another of the philosophical positions called “realism.”
Articulation (sociology · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Ontology · Political science · Realism · Taxonomy (biology · Terminology · Variance (accounting · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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