Moving between frustration and anger

Bibliographic Data

ID13006129
AuthorsMary Carman (0000-0002-8163-2100, University of the Witwatersrand, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume10
Issue2
Pages215-231
Publication date2019-12-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueGlobal Discourse (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2043-7897 • E-ISSN: 2326-9995
PublisherTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1332/204378919x15737047299120
OpenAlexW2996521245
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited16

Frustration is widely recognised to be central to many cases of moral anger in a political context, yet little philosophical attention has been paid to it. In this paper, I offer a much-needed philosophical analysis of frustration, working primarily with the example of the recent South African student protests. By developing a deeper philosophical understanding of frustration and its connections to moral anger, I argue that the movement between the two has a couple of important aspects. First, the movement involves a transformation from simply responding to some opposition to viewing that opposition as wrongfully imposed by an agent; second, in the cases that are my focus, the movement is a response to a persistent opposition that is compounded by an erosion of trust, confidence and hope within a moral community, which ultimately changes the very nature of the opposition into a form of wrongdoing. These aspects allow us to assess the appropriateness of the movement, thereby developing a rich analysis of moral anger arising out of frustration in a political context

Anger · Epistemology · Frustration · Indignation · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Wrongdoing · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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