Recognition probability in legislative bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13015673 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Natalie Lee (0000-0002-6335-7934, University of Amsterdam, corresponding author), Ravideep Sethi (0000-0001-8037-582X, University of Utah) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 202-223 |
| Publication date | 2023-09-18 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Experimental Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2052-2630 • E-ISSN: 2052-2649 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/xps.2023.26 |
| OpenAlex | W4386833736 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 36 |
In legislative bargaining, the proposer is often able to extract a greater proportion of the surplus. However, a higher likelihood of being selected as the proposer can backfire, as it may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to recognition probability in two-period legislative bargaining noted in Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We find that higher recognition probability benefits subjects in all treatments, except one in which we automate the second period. It is because proposers often favor the member with the greater recognition probability as a coalition partner, and such tendency varies depending on the proposer’s recognition probability, counter to the theoretical prediction. In all treatments, a vast majority of subjects exhibit a strict preference for higher recognition probability
Econometrics · Economics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Preference · Probability model · Statistics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Mathematics
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| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |