Bureaucracy and policymaking
Evidence from a choice-based conjoint analysis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 13016613 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marta Batista (0000-0002-2456-4164, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Research & Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2053-1680 • E-ISSN: 2053-1680 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/20531680231180980 |
| OpenAlex | W4386916229 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 26 |
Bureaucrats are a fundamental part of the functioning of the modern state and democracies. However, there is still much disagreement about the ideal profile of bureaucrats to deliver quality and responsive policies. Bureaucrats can be meritocratically recruited or politically appointed, creating the dilemma between autonomy and accountability. This article explores this dilemma, identifying the profile of bureaucrats perceived as having the best performance in the different policymaking dimensions. The study explored the form of recruitment, the level of experience, and the bureaucrat’s gender as characteristics of interest. Using data from an original survey with high-ranking bureaucrats in Brazil, we implement conjoint analysis to identify the most valued profile. The results indicate that the bureaucrat recruited through the merit system is more valued in the dimensions of “transparency,” “evidence,” “political coordination,” and “general preference of respondents.” This result is independent of the bureaucrat’s experience, so the effect is related to the recruitment form. However, the politically appointed bureaucrat is more valued in the dimension of “effort.” Gender did not generate significant effects. The article brings experimental evidence to increase understanding of how bureaucratic autonomy and accountability connect to deliver better government performance
Accountability · Autonomy · Bureaucracy · Dilemma · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Preference · Public economics · Public relations · Quality (philosophy · Ranking (information retrieval · Transparency (behavior · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations
Economy and Society
Bureaucracy & Representative Government
Organizing Leviathan
Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Gender, Representative Bureaucracy, and Law Enforcement
A Theoretical Overview of Representative Bureaucracy
Testing Pendleton's Premise
The Motivational Bases of Public Service
Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats
Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis
Exit, Voice, and Sabotage
Bureaucratic Structure, Regulatory Quality, and Entrepreneurship in a Comparative Perspective
State Capacity, Bureaucratic Politicization, and Corruption in the Brazilian State
Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior
Comparative Bureaucratic Politics
Theories Ofdelegation
Women Ministers in Latin American Government
Bureaucracy and Growth
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from a Dominant Party Regime
Bureaucratic Effects
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |