Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 13016802 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Brett V Benson (Vanderbilt University), Adam Meirowitz (0000-0003-4671-8889, University of Utah), Kristopher W Ramsay (Princeton University), Kristopher Ramsay (0000-0002-3446-1820, Princeton University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2016 |
| Volumen | 3 |
| Número | 3 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2016-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Research & Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 2053-1680 • E-ISSN: 2053-1680 |
| Editorial | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/2053168016657687 |
| OpenAlex | W2516140075 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 12 |
| Referencias citadas | 22 |
Understanding how changes to war-fighting technology influence the probability of war is central to security studies. Yet the effects of changes in the distribution of power are not obvious. All else equal, increasing a country’s power makes it more aggressive when making demands or more resistant to accepting offers, but all else is not equal. Changes in power influence the behavior of both countries and can generate countervailing incentives. In this note we characterize the conditions relating changes in war payoffs to changes in the probability of bargaining failure and war. For a variety of cases the strategic effects can be entirely offsetting and no change in the probability of war results from changes in the balance of power, a result sometimes called neutrality. When this neutralization does not occur, interesting and sometimes surprising effects can persist. For example, if countries are risk averse and neutrality fails, then supporting the weaker country can reduce the probability of war rather than make war more likely, even though the weaker side will now make higher demands and reject more proposals in favor of war
Balance (ability · Bargaining power · Development economics · Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Neutrality · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Spanish Civil War · Variety (cybernetics · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Great Power Intervention and War
Reform and Rebellion in Weak States
Domestic constraints in crisis bargaining
Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining
Risk preferences, uncertainty, and war
The Effective Power of Military Coalitions
High valuations, uncertainty, and war
Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war
Less Is More? Shifting Power and Third-Party Military Assistance
The Uncertainty Trade-off
Penalizing Atrocities
In the Shadow of Power
Constructing International Security
Stability and the Distribution of Power
Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management
International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
How a War Ends
Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention
Politics at the Water’s Edge
Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War
Rationalist explanations for war
Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention
War as a Commitment Problem
Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution
The Armed Peace
Deterring Intervention
Bargaining and Fighting
Arms Races and Arms Control
Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation
The Road to Hell? Third‐Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities
The Inefficient Use of Power
Information, Power, and War
| Obras citantes distintas | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,71 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2019 - 2024 (6) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 12 |